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THE LAWYER AND THE QUALITY OF
SERVICE TO THE POOR AND
DISADVANTAGED CLIENT: LEGAL SERVICES
TO THE INSTITUTIONALIZED
Walter Dickey*
Client dissatisfaction with legal services is commonly recognized
as a serious problem. Based on extensive experience with disad-
vantaged clients confined to correctional and mental institutions,
Professor Dickey contends that much of this dissatisfaction is justi-
fied. In this Article, he describes and illustrates the qualities that
lawyers need to function effectively as members of a "helping pro-
fession," and offers suggestions for the development of those
qualities.
The quality of legal services is considered unsatisfactory by many
poor and disadvantaged clients, particularly those who are confined in
correctional and mental health institutions. Careful objective observa-
tion and inquiry demonstrate that the reasons for dissatisfaction ex-
tend beyond the fact of confinement.1 In many of the situations of
legitimate client dissatisfaction, the lawyer has performed in accord-
ance with current professional standards-standards which do not in
fact give adequate emphasis to meeting the needs of the client. This
variance between professional standards of competency and adequate
service to clients' needs results from a number of factors.
First, the economics of the legal profession frequently make it diffi-
cult for the lawyer to serve the client adequately, especially in the
criminal law field where compensation typically is limited to provid-
ing a traditional criminal defense. The client's needs often go beyond
representation in the criminal case and include the need for what
might be viewed as social work or civil legal aid assistance. The eco-
nomic resources to provide for service beyond the immediate needs
of the criminal case are rarely available.
A second reason is that "service to the client" has not been a prin-
cipal criterion for evaluating the quality of the lawyer's work.
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance Program,
University of Wisconsin. The author wishes to thank Frank Remington who gave him the oppor-
tunity to work on the Legal Assistance Program. Professor Dickey states that the guidance and
example of the supervising attorneys, as well as the enthusiasm of students, helped him reach
whatever insight is in this Article.
1. For a helpful recent examination of the problems relating to providing quality legal
services to the poor, see Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977).
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Achieving law reform, often thought to be in the "public interest,"
receives higher status in professional and academic circles than serv-
ing the "client's interest." Although the "public interest" in law re-
form and the "client's interest" may coincide, they may also conflict.
And when they are in conflict, serving the "public interest" is a dis-
service to the client. Yet many legal service agencies funded to serve
the poor and disadvantaged give great stress to law reform and give
low priority to serving the needs of the individual client.
A third reason is that lawyers have great difficulty in helping poor
and disadvantaged clients identify their problems and best interests.
When the client is poor and comes from a cultural, economic, or
social background which is different than the lawyer's, the gap in the
lawyer's understanding of the client may result in advice that has un-
anticipated and devastating effects. In such situations, lawyers too
often tell indigent clients what services they need rather than involve
them in identifying their problems and interests. Lawyers assume
that they know best how to defend a criminal case and how to iden-
tify the law reform aspects of a poor client's situation. Lawyers for the
poor often are better at "telling the client" than they are in "listening
to the client," and are convinced that the client needs to learn from
the lawyer rather than the lawyer from the client. The result is an
understandable frustration on the part of the client that develops into
anger and alienation when the lawyer's failure to be sufficiently con-
cerned appears to result in serious disadvantage to the client.
My experience as director of the Wisconsin Law School Legal
Assistance Program-which has conducted careful "diagnostic" inter-
views of literally thousands of indigent correctional inmates and men-
tal health patients and then provided "full service" legal aid to
them-has led me to several conclusions about the qualities needed
to provide high quality services to confined clients. The significance
of these conclusions are relevant to the needs of all poor and disad-
vantaged people. It may also tell us a great deal about the legal serv-
ices needs of those who are more economically affluent.
First, to effectively serve clients, lawyers need an understanding of
the impact on the client of advice and decisionmaking by lawyers.
With reference to the accused, it is important for lawyers to know the
human consequences of criminal conviction and mental commitment
because, every day, they give advice and make decisions which have
a profound impact upon the lives of individuals. Without an under-
standing of the alternatives under consideration, it is impossible to
adequately help clients make informed decisions that may seriously
affect them.
[Vol. 27:407
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Second, lawyers need to understand the professional role of the
lawyer. Members of the bar often are uncertain of their responsibility
in certain situations and how the interests of clients can best be
served. For example, with regard to juveniles and the mentally ill,
lawyers often are confused as to whether their responsibility is to
keep the person out of the institution or to obtain some form of
treatment which will hopefully help to resolve the delinquency or
mental illness. With regard to the criminally accused, lawyers often
feel that their responsibility to the client ends with the resolution of
the charge when, in fact, the client has many other problems-some
related to the charge, many to eventual reassimilation into the com-
munity-which require legal assistance.
Third, understanding how the criminal justice and mental health
systems operate enhances lawyer representation of clients. Too often,
lawyers make decisions and give advice without an adequate under-
standing of the implications of the advice for the client at later stages
of the system. For example, detainers and parole discretion have
profound effects on the correctional treatment of the confined. Few
lawyers, in my experience, adequately explore the effects of detainers
and a person's realistic chances for parole with their clients, even
though detainers and parole are significant factors to be considered
before an informed decision can be made as to whether to plead
guilty, a common disposition of criminal cases.
Fourth, lawyers need to bring their substantive knowledge and
skills to bear effectively on the integrated problems they confront.
While insight into clients' problems, knowledge of relevant law, and
analytical and writing skills are certainly a prerequisite for the resolu-
tion of problems, lawyers must also exercise sound judgment. The
problems are complex and require the integration of skills if they are
to be solved.
This Article suggests the need to reformulate current responses to
the legal services needs of the poor, particularly the institutionalized
poor, so that services can reflect the needs of the clients rather than
the economics and traditional specialization of the legal profession.
The status of serving the "client's interest" should be recognized as
being as important as serving "law reform" interests, and lawyers
should learn to be more concerned about adequately diagnosing the
client's needs than persuading the client to accept traditional legal
services. The Article also suggests that it may be necessary to restruc-
ture legal aid offices to serve clients more adequately. Courses in law
school and continuing education programs for lawyers also should be
created to foster these additional qualities. One such course, de-
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veloped at the University of Wisconsin Law School, is discussed in
detail in the Appendix to this Article.
I. DATA
The "data" in this Article are drawn from the experiences of the
Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance Program (WLAP).2 Staff at-
torneys and students have provided legal services to confined mental
patients and correctional inmates at all state institutions for over ten
years. 3 Work has been completed on roughly eleven hundred such
cases each year for the past four years. For several years prior to that,
similar work was done for a limited number of clients.
The initial contact with the client comes during their first month
of institutionalization as part of the four-week "Adjustment and
Evaluation Process." A diagnostic interview with each newly admitted
patient and inmate is designed to elicit all the difficulties the client
has with which a lawyer might be of help. The types of problems of
the clients have received a detailed description elsewhere. 4
The student or attorney completes a seven-page interview form on
each potential client, and writes a memorandum detailing the facts
discovered, the issues that have arisen or are anticipated, and what
should be explored or done to help the client if assistance is re-
quested. Detailed records are kept of the work done and the results
achieved.
The interviews and case work have several purposes. We wish to
understand the legal needs (typically wide ranging) of these clients,
and to help them solve or cope with their problems. In addition, we
wish to understand how these clients can best be served by the legal
profession. Finally, we attempt to equip law students to be effective
in client service by having them assist inmates and patients in the
2. The Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance Program consists of three projects. The
Legal Assistance To Inmates Project provides services to state correctional inmates and to resi-
dents of the Federal Correctional Institution at Oxford, Wisconsin. The Mental Health Project
provides services to patients in the three state mental institutions. The Post-Conviction Defense
Project specializes in post-conviction matters and provides services to all inmates and patients at
state institutions.
3. The Legal Assistanbe Program began providing services at the Federal Correctional In-
stitution at Oxford in 1973. For a description of the early years of the program, see REMINGTON,
Wisconsin Correctional Internship Program, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASHEVILLE CONFERENCE
OF LAW SCHOOL DEANS ON EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 56 (1965); Kim-
ball, Introduction: Inmate Problems and Correctional Administration, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 571.
4. Dickey & Remington, Legal Services for Institutionalized Persons -An Overlooked Need,
1976 S. ILL. L.J. 175.
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resolution of their problems. This Article is devoted to analyzing my
conclusions about how quality legal services can be provided.
The examples in this Article are meant to be illustrative of common
problems encountered by Wisconsin faculty and law students in the
Legal Assistance Program, and the qualities lawyers need to solve
these problems. They are often very complex and difficult to under-
stand fully, but only in their full complexity do the underlying prob-
lems for the legal profession emerge. It is for this reason that the
cases are discussed in detail.
As will be apparent, many of the illustrations could be used to
support more than one conclusion. For example, Illustration 1,
below, supports the conclusions that lawyers need to understand the
human consequences of their advice, need to better understand their
professional responsibilities, and should understand how the criminal
justice and mental health systems operate in action. It would be an
oversimplification to argue that the illustration supports only one of
these conclusions, to the exclusion of others. Indeed, it is usually a
combination of a lack of these qualities that has unfortunate results for
clients. However, in the interests of clarity, I have isolated illustra-
tions according to the conclusion they most appropriately support.
II. QUALITIES IN THE PROFESSION NECESSARY FOR
EFFECTIVE CLIENT SERVICE
A. Sensitivity to the Human Consequences
of Advice and Decisionmaking
Every day, judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers make deci-
sions that affect the lives of defendants and their families. It is vitally
important for lawyers to know the human implications of their advice
and decisions, for the consequences of not knowing can be devastat-
ing for the client.5 Such consequences include the following:
5. A number of articles allude to the broad range of problems stemming from arrest, con-
viction, commitment, and confinement, often in the course of describing various programs that
provide legal services to this population. A few treat the civil and familial problems caused or
exacerbated by confinement, which can be addressed legally, as well as criminally related pris-
oner and patient grievances. See M. FINKELSTEIN, PERSPECTIVES ON PRISON LEGAL SERVICES:
NEEDS, IMPACT, AND THE POTENTIAL LAW SCHOOL INVOLVEMENT (1971); Dickey & Rem-
ington, Legal Assistance for Institutionalized Persons-An Overlooked Need, 1976 S. ILL. L.J.
175; Kimball, Introduction: Inmate Problems and Correctional Administration, 1969 WIS. L.
REV. 571; Pye, Law School Training in Criminal Law, 3 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 172 (1965); REM-
INGTON, Wisconsin Correctional Internship Program in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASHEVILLE
CONFERENCE OF LAW SCHOOL DEANS ON EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 56
(1965); Weintraub, Delivery of Services to Families of Prisoners, 40 FED. PROB. 28 (1976). See
also L. SILVER-STEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR (1965); Comment, Resolving Civil Problems of
19771
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(1) Inmates and patients become frustrated and bitter.
They believe that they are being treated unfairly because the
advice they take has results that were not explained to them
and that they do not anticipate.
(2) Inmates and patients do not receive the help in the
institution that they think they need and will receive. Some-
times therapy is unavailable; or jobs, vocational training, and
education are unavailable or are denied because of the in-
mates' security classification.
(3) The families of patients and inmates sometimes suffer
greatly from the fact of confinement.
(4) The above results, in turn, adversely affect the in-
mates' and patients' responsiveness to the treatment and
programs that are available. Thus, the correctional process is
frustrated.
Often, if these results were foreseen, different decisions might have
been made and different advice given.
Three illustrations indicate how these consequences are sometimes
brought about. Illustration 1 deals with a situation in which some
form of confinement of the client seems inevitable. The question is
whether it is more desirable that a person be committed under Wis-
consin's Sex Crimes Law 6 or sentenced under the criminal code. The
Correctional Inmates, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 574; Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967
Wis. L. REV. 514.
Many more works deal primarily with legal problems connected with the confined person's
commitment or conviction, collateral criminal and mental health matters, and dissatisfaction
with conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175 (1970), an updated and expanded version of which is included in
R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION: A DEFINITIVE AND COMPELLING STUDY OF
THE AMERICAN CORRECTION SYSTEM 359-526 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDFARB &
SINCER]; Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Liti-
gation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1971); Wexler, Counselling Convicts: The Lawyer's Role in Un-
covering Legitimate Claims, 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 629 (1969).
6. See generally, WIS. STAT. §§ 975.01-975.18 (1975). Unlike the sexual psychopathy laws
in many states, Wisconsin's Sex Crimes Law comes into play only after conviction of specified
sex offenses. In sum, it calls for mandatory commitment of all persons convicted of those of-
fenses for the purposes of a "social, physical and mental examination" to determine the need for
"specialized treatment" for sexual deviancy. This sixty-day maximum examination commitment
can also be ordered for persons convicted of any other offense except homicide and attempted
homicide if the court finds that "the defendant was probably directly motivated by a desire for
sexual excitement in the commission of the crime." Id. §§ 975.01-975.02 (1975). If the Wiscon-
sin Department of Health and Social Services, the department to which the convicted person is
committed, recommends specialized treatment for his "mental or physical aberrations," a hear-
ing is held on the question of such need, and if the jury, if one is demanded by defendant, or
the court concurs with the recommendation of the department, the person is committed for an
indeterminate period. Id. §§ 975.06-975.12.
Many studies have been conducted of the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Law. The history and legis-
lative purpose of the law are discussed in Huebner v. State, 33 Wis.2d 505, 521-26, 147
[Vol. 27:407
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illustration shows the importance of fully understanding the consequ-
ences of both types of disposition before advising a client.
Illustration 1. A patient in a maximum security mental hospital had
received a 30-year commitment for rape under the sex crimes law.
He desired to "get back to court" to have this commitment
changed to a sentence and expressed a sense of frustration and
injustice, because his lawyer told him that it was in his best inter-
est to be in Central State Hospital, where he would receive treat-
ment and eventually be released when he was "cured."
The law student to whom the patient revealed his complaint inves-
tigated the matter carefully. The plea of guilty transcript revealed
that the defense lawyer advised the client to waive his right to a
hearing 7 on the issue of whether he should be committed and to
accept the recommendation that he be committed. In fact, the de-
fense lawyer, the judge and the prosecutor all agreed that commit-
ment was in the client's best interest. The client thus pleaded guilty
N.W.2d 646, 654-56 (1967); and in Note, Wisconsin's Sexual Deviate Act, 1954 Wis. L. REv.
324. Articles about the operation of the law include Coogan, Wisconsin's Experience in Treating
the Psychiatrically-Deviated Sexual Offender, I J. Soc. THERAPY 3 (1955); Halleck & Pacht,
The Current Status of the Wisconsin State Sex Crimes Law, 33 Wis. B. BULL. 17 (1960) [here-
inafter cited as Halleck & Pacht]; Comment, Criteria for Commitment under the Wisconsin Sex
Crimes Act, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 980. Several articles concentrate on the psychiatrist's role in the
operation of the law, but also present a useful picture of the types of committees assembled
under these provisions, recidivism rates, and methods of diagnosis for both original and exten-
sion commitments. See F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAW: THE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY
ILL (1961) [hereinafter cited as LINDMAN & MCINTYRE]; PACHT, HALLECK & EHRMANN,
Psychiatric Treatment of the Sex Offender, in II CURRENT PSYCHIATRIC THERAPIES (1962);
Cowden & Pacht, The Sex Inventory as a Classification Instrument for Sex Offenders,* 25 J.
CLIN. PSYCH. 53 (1969); Pacht, Halleck & Ehrmann, Diagnosis and Treatment of the Sexual
Offender: A Nine-Year Study, 118 AM. J. PSYCH. 802 (1962); Roberts & Pacht, Termination of
Inpatient Treatment for Sex Deviates-Psychiatric, Social and Legal Factors, 121 AM. J.
PSYCH. 873 (1965). For a favorable view of such special legislation, see Sutherland, The Diffu-
sion of Sexual Psychopath Laws, 56 AM. J. Soc. 142 (1950). There are many analyses of the
design and operation of other specific state sexual offender programs and the problems they
raise for sex offenders, including Dix, Differential Processing of Abnormal Sex Offenders: Utili-
zation of California's Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program, 67 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY (1976); Granucci & Granucci, Indiana's Sexual Psychopath Act in Operation, 44 IND. L.J.
555 (1969); McGarry & Cotton, A Study in Civil Commitment: The Massachusetts Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 263 (1969); Note, Toward a Less Benevolent De-
spotism: The Case for Abolition of California's MDSO Laws, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 579 (1973).
A list of many other state programs can be found in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 596-97 (1974). Some works analyzing the broad range of state ap-
proaches are: L. TANCREDI, J. LiEB & A. SLABY, LEGAL ISSUES IN PSYCHIATRIC CARE 93-98
(1975); Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
215 (1960); Comment, Evolution of a Procedural Hybrid: The Sexual Sociopath Statutes and
Judicial Response, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 90 (1976); Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath: A
Legislative Blunder and Judicial Acquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 527, 528-38 (1966).
7. Huebner v. State, 33 Wis.2d 505, 147 N.W.2d 646 (1967).
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on the assumption that he ultimately would be. committed and waived
his right to a hearing as to whether commitment was appropriate.
The client was upset because he believed, upon experience and
reflection, that commitment was not in his best interests. At the time
of the plea and commitment, the maximum sentence for rape under
the criminal code was thirty years. 8 Maximum sentences are rarely
given, and a person so sentenced is not subject to any extension or
increase in the term of his confinement. In contrast, commitment
under the Sex Crimes Law is automatically for the maximum term,
and confinement may be extended indefinitely if the department to
which commitment is made determines that discharge would be
dangerous to the public. 9 Had the man been sentenced as a correc-
tional inmate, he in all likelihood would not have received the
maximum term, and he would not have been exposed to extensions of
confinement beyond the stated term. He was angry that this had not
been explained to him before his plea and waiver.
The patient also learned that the criteria for release, while taking
into account his responsiveness to treatment, were in large measure
identical to those used by the correctional parole board. Included
among these criteria are the need for punishment (by serving a
minimum number of years), the seriousness of the offense, and the
dangerousness of the offender. The client felt that this was inconsis-
tent with the rhetoric of the Sex Crimes Act, which led the man to
believe that he needed "specialized treatment," would receive it and,
when he was cured, would be released.
The lawyer's perception of the treatment program and conditions at
the institution and the criteria for release 10 were erroneous. The
"hospital" in reality is as restrictive as but less comfortable than a
8. WIS. STAT. § 944.01 (1973).
9. WIS. STAT. § 975.13 (1975).
10. The likelihood that a sex crime offender will be confined longer than he would have
been as a correctional inmate depends, of course, on the individual case. See Comment,
Criteria for Commitment Under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 980; Com-
ment, The Special Review Board, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 172. Halleck points out the possibility of
longer confinement in Halleck, A Critique of Current Psychiatric Roles in the Legal Process,
1966 Wis. L. REV. 379, 392 [hereinafter cited as Halleck]. See also V. KNOPPKE-WETZEL,
DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES IN WISCONSIN 16-3 to 16-4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
KNOPPKE-WETZEL] which points out some factors that defense counsel should consider when
advising a client subject to the Sex Crimes Law. For example, a father convicted of incest is
often released after one year if the home situation has changed sufficiently to assure protection
of the victim. Consultation with a psychiatrist who is familiar with the specialized treatment
program currently available at Central State Hospital may be helpful in judging whether the
specific client could make progress under such a regime. If he would not be able to respond to
available modes of therapy, he might well spend more time in treatment than he would under a
sentence.
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maximum security prison. It has limited treatment resources and job
opportunities and an inadequate staff of social workers.
The client was angry, for the maximum security correctional in-
stitution might have been preferable to the hospital. The patient
would have been able to work in a prison, avoid the idleness of the
hospital, and earn some money for his personal needs. No job was
available for the patient in the mental health institution. The rhetoric
about the institution being a "hospital" had led the inmate to make a
choice that in fact limited the available vocational and school pro-
grams and industries.
The only treatment provided the patient was two group therapy
sessions per week and the "milieu therapy" of simply being in the
institution. The required periodic re-examinations to determine re-
lease were not being made.'
The patient's negative feelings were reflected in his attitude toward
the institution staff, the parole board, and the other patients. The law
student who assisted him felt that these might have been interpreted
as resistance to therapy and poor adjustment to the institution. This,
in turn, would likely delay his release from the institution and might
profoundly affect his attitude and actions when he ultimately was re-
leased.
Clearly, defense counsel's advice as to the implications of the plea
and waiver, what the client could expect at the institution, and the
criteria for release on parole was inaccurate. The incorrect percep-
tions were apparently shared by the prosecutor and judge in this
case. As a result both the inmate and the mental health process were
frustrated.
Many correctional inmates and mental health patients, like the pa-
tient in Illustration 1, might receive substantially different sentences
if judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys knew the true implica-
tions of particular sentences for people. For example, judges fre-
quently explain their reasons for imposing relatively long sentences
by stating that the convicted person will receive an early parole re-
lease. In fact, the criteria for parole release are often not adequately
defined, and it is difficult to predict when a particular inmate will be
paroled. More significant, perhaps, are the collateral implications of
lengthy sentences for inmates. If judges were aware of these implica-
tions, many of which defeat the purposes of the judges in imposing
11. WIS. STAT. § 975.09 (1975). The status of the periodic examination remains uncertain.
State ex rel. Terry v. Schubert, 74 Wis.2d 487, 247 N.W.2d 109 (1976), vacated sub nom Percy
v. Terry, - U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 40 (1977),
1977] 415
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particular sentences, sentencing practices might be modified, as Il-
lustration 2 suggests.
Illustration 2. The inmate wanted his two 10-year consecutive sen-
tences for burglary and arson of a church reduced. He was not able
to clearly articulate why his sentence should be reduced, but the
man did raise enough questions in the mind of the student who
interviewed him to lead her to investigate the case.
Among the unanticipated consequences of the sentences were: (1)
the client was confined for a longer period than the judge anticipated,
simply because of the length of the sentences; (2) the client was de-
nied access to the vocational programs in which he had interest be-
cause of the effect of his sentences on his security classification; (3)
the client was denied access to the Mutual Agreement Program be-
cause of the length of his sentences; and (4) the client was bitter
because he felt that the purposes of sending him to prison were not
being fulfilled.
The sentencing transcript revealed that the prosecutor argued and
the judge agreed that "unless consecutive ten year sentences are im-
posed, he will be paroled in a year." In fact, the parole of an inmate
after serving one year of a 10-year sentence is practically non-exis-
tent. An inmate who makes average progress can expect parole re-
lease in about three and one-half years if the crime was not one in-
volving assault.' 2  And, assuming that the inmate earned all the
"good time" for which he is eligible, his mandatory release date, i.e.,
the date on which he must be paroled, is roughly five and one-half
years from sentencing. 13 This particular inmate received two 12-
month deferrals from the parole board, the maximum deferral it gave
at the time, and the board cited the length of sentence as a reason for
refusing to grant parole. 14 The judge indicated at a hearing on a
motion to modify the sentence that he did not think the man would
be confined for as long as he was.
The classification committee which determines an inmate's security
rating and thus his institutional assignment, assigned the client to a
maximum security institution. The committee felt compelled to follow
the informal administrative guideline that inmates with sentences of
eight years or more be assigned to maximum security in spite of its
belief that other factors, such as the man's age, his vocational inter-
est, and its judgment that he is not dangerous, would dictate assign-
12. Wisconsin Division of Corrections, Offenders Released From Adult Correctional Institu-
tions Calendar 1976 (Statistical Bulletin C-54, June 1977).
13. WIs. STAT. § 53.11 (1975).
14. WIS. STAT. § 57.06 (1975). Women are immediately eligible for parole. Id. § 57.07.
[Vol. 27:407
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ment to an institution which permitted greater freedom and responsi-
bility. 15
Because of the length of sentence imposed, the inmate was denied
an opportunity to pursue his vocational interest in drafting. Since
drafting courses were available in a minimum security institution but
not in the maximum security institution, he was assigned to work in
the kitchen.
The long sentence also prohibited the inmate, by administrative
regulation, from participating in the Mutual Agreement Program even
though his social worker thought it appropriate. This is a program in
which the parole board and the inmate contract for parole release in
return for satisfactory completion of vocational and instructional pro-
grams and avoidance of serious disciplinary difficulties. It provides
useful incentives for inmates.
Understandably, the inmate was very demoralized by the effect
that his sentence had on him. Correctional officials also were frus-
trated by their inability to provide this inmate with the program best
suited for him.
Besides directly affecting the confined person, confinement in men-
tal health and correctional institutions also has serious human con-
sequences for the inmate's family. The effect on the person's family,
in turn, often influences his conduct in the institution, his involve-
ment in correctional programs, and his ultimate reassimilation into
15. The classification procedure at the Wisconsin State Reformatory is described in Com-
ment, Administration Fairness in Corrections, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 587. See Goldfarb & Singer,
supra note 5, at 91-95 for discussion of the functions of reception centers and inmate classifica-
tion procedures. See also THE AMERICAN PRISON ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK ON CLASSIFICA-
TION IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (rev. ed. 1965); AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 352-56, 358-61, 364-65 (1966) which states:
The primary objective of classification as a systematic process is the development
and administration of an integrated and realistic program of treatment for the indi-
vidual, with procedures for changing the program when indicated . . . . [It is] the
process through which the resources of the correctional institution can be applied
effectively to the individual case.
Id. at 353. For a discussion of classification in general and of the competing needs for specificity
and flexibility in classification guidelines see Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I.
1970).
There is evidence that prisoners' attitudes toward judges and lawyers improve after they are
exposed to legal assistance programs, at least partly because they feel their problems are being
coped with, which reduces their sense of isolation. See M. FINKELSTEIN, PERSPECTIVES ON
PRISON LEGAL SERVICES (1971); GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 5.
The legal counsel of the Federal Bureau of Prisons stated that inmates experience a beneficial
effect when there is someone on the outside to listen to them. See Barkin, Impact of Changing
Law Upon Prison Policy, 48 PRISON J. 19 (1968). See also Alpert, Prisoners' Rights of Access to
Courts: Planning for Legal Aid, 51 WASH. L. REV. 653 (1976).
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the community. These consequences ought to bear on the sentencing
decision. The following example illustrates the serious implications of
confinement on family and family relationships, and the need for
lawyers to identify the collateral consequences of their advice.
Illustration 3. A newly arrived inmate at the Wisconsin State
Prison indicated that he was 45 years old, had been convicted of
armed robbery and kidnapping, and had received a 10-year sen-
tence. These were the inmate's first offenses and were apparently
committed in economic desperation. He had been laid off from two
jobs during the year prior to the offenses and had attempted sev-
eral business ventures which failed. The inmate's wife was seri-
ously ill, and the family had no health insurance. Three of his four
children were too young to work full time and required dental
work totaling $3800. The man was extremely anxious about the fact
that his wife was ill and without money and his children "had no
father." Furthermore the man was terrified of the maximum se-
curity institution.
Investigation substantiated both the validity of the reported facts
and the seriousness of the inmate's anxiety. The institutional social
worker and psychiatrist feared that, in desperation, the inmate
might try to kill himself. At the very least, they believed, his frus-
tration and fears posed special problems to the institution, and the
man's feelings of powerlessness to help his family might be acted
out in violent ways.
The above example illustrates the profound effect confinement may
have on the family of the confined person. What will happen to the
wife and children and how this will affect his behavior both in the
institution and when he is released are questions the answers to
which we only can guess. The sentencing transcript and presentence
report revealed that none of the facts about the man's economic cir-
cumstances or family situation had been taken into consideration at
sentencing. Whether they would have influenced the sentence is
problematic, but they are relevant to the decision. 16  Because the
judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney were unaware of the man's
family problems, they were unable to alleviate any of his concerns or
provide his family with help by communicating the problems to the
county social workers.
Without knowledge of the human consequences of confinement,
many of which are illustrated above, the lawyer cannot intelligently
advise a client nor recommend a sentence.
16. See Weatherall v. State, 73 Wis.2d 22, 242 N.W.2d 220 (1976); Dash, Medalie, & Rho-
den, Demonstrating Rehabilitative Planning as a Defense Strategy, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 408
(1969).
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B. An Understanding of the Professional
Role of the Lawyer
It is not always easy to know the scope and nature of a lawyer's
responsibility to a client or the measure of its success.17 Often attor-
neys and clients see the responsibility as a narrow one. For example,
the criminal lawyer is considered successful if he secures an acquittal
or a short period of confinement for his client, or if broad law reform
is achieved by a particular case.
But people charged with crimes, people who are subject to com-
mitment proceedings, correctional inmates and confined patients usu-
ally have complicated problems. Their resolution often requires
someone to go beyond the immediate concern of the case, the adjudi-
cation of guilt or innocence, or the determination of sentence.
Unfortunately, these complex problems are not always addressed
by lawyers. While there are other reasons for this, at least two are
related to professional responsibility. First, the lawyer may be aware
of a client's problems but not view them as within the scope of his
responsibility. The second reason is that the lawyer may never iden-
tify the client's problem fully, because he does not "listen" to the
client, but "tells" the client what is best for him. The lawyer often
believes that it is for him to decide what is in the client's best inter-
est and then persuade the client to take his advice.
The following illustrations make several points:
(1) Client problems often are complex and require more of
lawyers than simply attention to adjudication of the case.
(2) It is critical, if clients are to be served effectively, that
they be fully informed of the options available to them and
involved in the identification of their best interests. Lawyers
should counsel clients, not decide what clients ought to do
and then persuade them to do it by withholding information
or exaggerating consequences.
(3) Problems which may not seem significant to lawyers
may be important to clients. Lawyers should be sensitive to
this fact.
17. See E. CAHN, The Consumers of Injustice, in CONFRONTING INJUSTICE: THE EDMOND
CAHN READER #5 (1966); J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1972); D. ROSENTHAL,
LAW AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 61 (1974); Atkins & Boyle, Prisoner Satisfaction with
Defense Counsel, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 427 (1976); Bresnahan, "Ethics" and the Study and Prac-
tice of Law: The Problem of Being Professional in a Fuller Sense, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189
(1976); Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defen-
der, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACT. 4 (1971); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Founda-
tions of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Gard, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel-Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L. REV. 483 (1976); Mazor, Power and Responsi-
bility in the Attorney-Client Relation, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1120 (1968).
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(4) The questions of professional responsibility raised by
the illustrations are troubling and difficult to answer. Clients
would be greatly helped if lawyers' professional responsibility
were defined with reference to clients' needs.
(5) The nature of client problems is such that some re-
structuring of lawyer offices may be necessary to most effi-
ciently solve them.
Five problems which raise specific questions of the lawyer's re-
sponsibility to clients follow. Whatever the reason for the fact that the
lawyers defined their responsibility narrowly, or in a way that is argu-
ably inconsistent with the client's best interests, it is apparent in each
case that there were unfortunate consequences for the clients.
Illustration 4. An inmate in a segregation cell (a form of solitary
confinement) asked to be represented at a hearing before the in-
stitution's disciplinary committee. The man said that he had re-
ceived a disciplinary ticket for attempting to kill himself and that
he could forfeit some earned good time if the disciplinary commit-
tee so decided.
The inmate revealed that the reason for his attempted suicide
was that he was depressed because his wife was being bothered by
a man in the rural community in which she lived. The inmate was
frustrated at his inability to help his wife and was fearful for her
safety. He was also deeply concerned about his wife's financial
situation. She was poor, out of work, and in debt. The inmate had
been convicted of "Conduct Regardless of Life" for having fired a
gun at the very person who was now harassing his wife, after a
confrontation over a visit by the other man to the inmate's home
while he was away.
The lawyer who represented the client on the criminal charge for
which he was confined had not explored the economic, social, or
psychological ramifications of the client's plight. The client had re-
ceived a relatively short sentence for the crime and was satisfied with
his lawyer's work on the case. Apparently, the attorney did not feel
that it was his responsibility to inquire about the wife's ability to cope
by herself while her husband was confined or to take steps to prevent
further harassment by the victim.
The second lawyer was able to help this client. He persuaded the
local sheriff to increase the patrols around the wife's house, counseled
her to contact him if there were further difficulties, and informed the
man who visited the woman that he was not welcome. The lawyer
also persuaded the family's creditor to wait until the husband's re-
lease before requiring further payment, and put the wife in contact
with the appropriate welfare agency. These measures reassured the
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woman and her husband and considerably alleviated their problems,
already exacerbated by the man's confinement.
Troubling professional responsibility problems are often raised in
the representation of people of doubtful mental competency to stand
trial.
Illustration 5. The client was committed to the state mental hospi-
tal because he was incompetent to stand trial. He had been
charged with disorderly conduct, had been sent to the state hospi-
tal for sixty days of observation, and had then been committed. He
wanted another attorney, because he claimed that he talked to his
present attorney for only five minutes on two occasions and that his
attorney had urged him to accept the commitment. He also wanted
to leave the institution.
Some attorneys regard a commitment for incompetency to stand
trial as a disposition superior to a criminal conviction.,,8 The client in
Illustration 5 stated that his lawyer said he would "do less time" if he
accepted the commitment. The lawyer did not explain his reasons for
this conclusion, but added that he would also get the treatment he
needed for his mental problems in the institution. But whether this is
a superior disposition depends upon the particular case. In Illustra-
tion 5, several factors suggest that an alternative, such as a plea of
guilty, may have been preferable.
Had the client been convicted of the substantive offense for which
he was charged, a misdemeanor, the maximum period of confinement
would have been 90 days. However, the client was now going to be
18. WIs. STAT. §§ 971.13, 971.14 (1971). WIS. STAT. § 971.13 provides that no person shall
be tried for an offense so long as he is "unable to understand the proceedings against him or to
assist in his own defense." This section also provides, as some state statutes do not, that the
defendant may not be convicted, sentenced, or committed for an offense so long as he fails to
meet those standards, which are in accord with Eizenstat's proposed model incompetency stat-
ute. See Eizenstat, Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HARv. C.R. -C.L. L. REv. 379 (1969).
The requisites of competency are discussed in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Attempts have been made to give more specific content to the generalized definition of incom-
petency given in Dusky and in most state statutes. See L. MCGARRY, COMPETENCY TO STAND
TmAL, ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT AND HANDBOOK (1972); Robey, Criteria for Competence to
Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 AM J. PSYCH. 616 (1965). Other important
sources discussing attempts to improve identification of those who are truly incompetent are
gathered in Brakel, Presumption, Bias and Incompetency in the Criminal Process, 1974 Wis. L.
Rav. 1105, 1108 n. 14, a very thought-provoking article which sets forth many of the practical
and philosophical difficulties with the concept of incompetency, and suggests that findings of
incompetency should be kept to an absolute minimum and that procedural rather than substan-
tive reforms may be a more fruitful way to protect potentially incompetent defendants.
WIs. STAT. § 971.14(5) (1975) no longer requires that a defendant be discharged after the
maximum period for which he could have been imprisoned if his conviction has elapsed. It
does, however, require competency re-examinations at six-month intervals.
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confined for at least 150 days-60 days in observation status and the
balance as provided by statute and hospital policy.
The man was very doncerned about the fact that the misdemeanor
charges against him were still outstanding. He was particularly upset
when he discovered he could still be convicted on these charges and
confined for an additional 90 days pursuant to that conviction, even if
he was committed for the maximum possible period as an incompe-
tent.19 He would receive no credit for his present confinement
against any sentence he might receive. 20
Furthermore, the man was probably more likely to be involuntarily
civilly committed for an indeterminate period after the incompetency
commitment. 21 As a practical matter, civil commitment proceedings
more likely would be commenced against someone in the hospital
than against an inmate in the county jail, where he would have been
confined after a conviction for the misdemeanor.
This man was receiving little, if any, treatment in the state hospi-
tal. This hospital is a maximum security institution with limited
treatment facilities and is not geared to treating people whose con-
finement is likely to be as short as this client's. This man did virtually
nothing while he was in the institution. Had he been sentenced in his
home county, he likely would have had work release privileges and
been able to retain his job. He feared that he would lose his job after
having missed so much work. Finally, the institution in which he was
confined was miles from his home, making it very difficult for his
family to visit.
The Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance Program has had ex-
tensive experience with clients committed as incompetent to stand
trial. Its experience is that, particularly where the charge is a mis-
demeanor, a client is much more likely to be released at the end of
the commitment and the charges are more likely to be dismissed if
the client has a job, a place to live, and access to some supportive
services (including outpatient treatment) in the community. The stu-
dent contacted the man's attorney, indicated this and offered to help.
19. In 1975, the legislature amended Wis. STAT. § 971.1465, deleting the section which
provided that commitment for the maximum term precluded conviction and confinement for the
same crime.
20. Milewski v. State, 74 Wis.2d 681, 248 N.W.2d 70 (1976).
21. See Burt & Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI.
L. REv. 66, 75 (1972), who propound the idea that even if a defendant is mentally impaired, he
is better off tried. McGarry & Bendt, Criminal vs. Civil Commitment of Psychotic Offenders: A
Seven-Year Follow-Up, 125 AM. J. PSYCH. 1387 (1969) found that the average length of con-
finement for an incompetent committee was 61 months, whereas it was only 14 months for civil
committees. At the end of a 7-year observation period, all civil committees had been returned
to the community, while the same was true for only 1 of 6 incompetency committees.
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The lawyer replied that, while the client would undoubtedly ap-
preciate such help, it was not within the scope of the lawyer's respon-
sibility to the client.
Illustration 5 raises serious questions about the professional respon-
sibility of lawyers to their clients. Whether it is in the client's best
interests to get treatment or to be confined for as short a period as
possible is difficult to know. However, the process by which the de-
cision is made is usually a telling one. If no effort is made to involve
the client in the decisionmaking process and to inform him of the
consequences of the alternatives, it is apparent that the lawyer views
his responsibility as deciding what is in the client's best interest. To
be concerned about the period of confinement without concern about
the quality of the help given during confinement and upon release
suggests that the lawyer does not see his responsibility to be to help
the client cope with problems and ultimately be reassimilated into
the community. It is doubtful if such a view of the lawyer's responsi-
bility is adequate to serve clients effectively. If the lawyer does not
share the client's concern, it is unlikely that alternatives to prison and
mental institutions will be sought.
The following example raises different 'issues of professional respon-
sibility:
Illustration 6. The inmate asked for legal assistance because he
wished his sentence reduced. He said that he had learned, from a
discussion with his social worker at the institution in which he was
confined, that there were inaccuracies in his presentence report.
He said that the report stated that his family life was very unsta-
ble, that other members of his family were felons, and that he was
unemployed at the time of the offense. These facts were untrue, he
claimed. He also said that the presentence report "implied" that he
was carrying a knife attached to his key ring. This gave the sen-
tencing judge the false impression that he was a dangerous person.
Had the sentencing court been aware of the true facts, he be-
lieved, he would have received a less severe sentence.
The inmate said that he had never seen the report, nor had he
discussed it with his lawyer before sentencing. In fact, he was not
sure his lawyer had even read the entire report. He said the
lawyer examined it in his presence "just before sentencing" and
had, as far as he could tell, only looked at the last page for the
recommendation of the probation officer who prepared the report.
He said the judge stated he had read the report before he imposed
sentence.
To investigate the client's claim, a copy of the presentence report and
the inmate's social services file 2 2 were checked. They revealed that
22. A complete correctional file can be found in F. REMINGTON, B. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL,
M. BELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION (1969).
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the inmate's concern about the accuracy of the report was well-
founded. The report contained many, although not all, of the inac-
curacies complained of by the inmate. It concluded that the inmate's
family life was unstable. However, the inmate's parents had never
been separated, the father continued to be steadily employed, and
the family owned its own home in a lower middle class section of the
city. Although the report characterized the family as unstable and an
unsuitable place for the inmate to return upon release, it made no
mention of other family members being felons. The report incor-
rectly reported that the man was unemployed at the time of the
offense.
The presentence report did state that the client was carrying a
knife when he was arrested. A check of the property still held at the
county jail revealed that it was a very small pocketknife, attached to a
key chain, with a one-and-one-half inch blade. The agent who pre-
pared the report did conclude from the knife and the fact that the
inmate had been involved in several fights in high school, that he was
dangerous and that confinement was recommended.
The transcript of the sentencing phase of the client's case revealed
several critical facts. The defense lawyer did not address the
background of the defendant in his remarks at sentencing. He made a
pro forma argument for probation for his client without any reference
to specific facts, without challenging the facts or the conclusions in
the report, and without offering any additional information.
The sentencing judge stated that he had read the report and even
commented that he knew the defendant's family and that it was a
"good one." This seemed to rebut the report's conclusion that the
man's family life was unstable. However, the judge said that he felt
the man was dangerous and should be confined. It was evident from
his remarks that the judge relied on the report in determining the
appropriate sentence.
The report's inaccurate information and conclusions continued to
have a profound effect on the inmate after sentencing. Virtually every
report or recommendation by institutional staff and parole board
members made reference to the man's carrying a knife while on the
streets and his unstable family life. These reports, usually quite terse,
never contained any facts supporting the conclusions and never indi-
cated that the facts relied on had not been verified. Dangerousness
was given as a reason for not transferring the man to a medium se-
curity institution. It was the basis for his social worker's recommenda-
tion that he not be paroled, and for the parole board's decision not to
grant parole.
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The board also indicated that before the man could be paroled, an
adequate parole plan which called for him to live outside his family
home should have been prepared. The judge's remarks at sentencing
which corrected the report's conclusion about the man's family were
not reflected in the file. The only page from the sentencing transcript
in the file was the one that contained the actual pronouncement of
the man's sentence.
The lawyer who worked on the case of the inmate described in
Illustration 6 came to the following conclusions:
(1) The presentence report is a critical factor in determin-
ing whether a convicted person is to be confined, the treat-
ment of the individual if he is confined, and the determina-
tion of parole release.
(2) The reliability of the presentence report is essential,
yet the reports often may contain objective inaccuracies, as
well as dubious inferences drawn from too little informa-
tion .23
(3) Inmates are often confused about the information in
the report and properly concerned about it, yet they rarely
see it or discuss it with their lawyer or anyone else. 24 Much
of their information comes from second-hand sources which
are inaccurate.
(4) The subject of the report must have access to it if its
accuracy is to be checked and misinformation corrected.
(5) Finally, the client's lawyer at sentencing is in the ap-
propriate position to ensure that the report is corrected and,
indeed, is often the only person in such a position. It is criti-
cal that the lawyer do this to fulfill his responsibility to assist
the client in solving the problems that may create future
difficulties.
Unfortunately, lawyers commonly do not reveal the presentence
report to their clients, nor do they discuss it with them. 25 As Illus-
tration 6 indicates, this practice can have profound effects on the
client. Complaints about the accuracy and effects of the reports are
common among inmates, and these complaints often have some foun-
23. The preliminary findings of a study conducted by the author reveal that a substantial
number of the inmates questioned in the Wisconsin correctional system indicated a belief that
there were factual inaccuracies in their presentence reports which adversely affected their sen-
tences.
24. The study alluded to in note 23 supra also indicates that a substantial number of clients
never see or discuss the report with their attorney.
25. See notes 23 & 24 supra.
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dation in fact. Of course, it is impossible to say whether the inac-
curacies affected the sentence imposed or the correctional treatment
of the inmate. However, at least in Wisconsin, the report is the
single most important document which affects a person's institutional
and program assignments, as well as parole decisions.
Why lawyers are not more attentive to the presentence report is
difficult to explain. Many may not recognize its significance beyond
sentencing. Another explanation may be that lawyers view sentencing
as a social work decision and not an important part of their function.
Some may believe that they are unable to affect the sentencing deci-
sion. Whatever the explanation, it is clear that the lawyer can assist
his client by ensuring that the report is accurate.
Perhaps the most common complaints of inmates about the quality
of their representation are directed to the guilty plea process. Inmate
comments and attitudes raise serious questions about the lawyer's re-
sponsibility at this critical stage, as the following illustration points
out.
Illustration 7. The inmate said that he wanted to "appeal" his con-
viction. He had pleaded guilty to burglary and expressed a great
deal of hostility and bitterness toward his attorney who, he said,
had "railroaded him."
The man had originally been charged with five counts of
burglary. His lawyer had told him that conviction on all five counts
was a certainty if the cases went to trial and that the judge would
impose the maximum penalty of 50 years- 10 years on each count.
If the defendant would plead guilty to one count, however, the
prosecutor would "read-in" the other four counts and would rec-
ommend a sentence of eight years. Confronted with these alterna-
tives, the defendant reluctantly agreed to plead guilty and received
the eight-year sentence. At the proceeding, a police officer whom
the defendant said he had never seen established the factual basis
for the crime from police reports.
When the man reached the institution he "heard that no one
ever received more than eight years for burglary, no matter how
many were committed" from that particular judge. He also stated
that had he gone to trial "he never would have been convicted"
because the police officer's testimony was hearsay and would not
have been admissible evidence and that he might just as well
"have taken his chances." For these reasons he wanted to withdraw
his guilty plea.
Investigation led to conclusions conflicting in some respects with
the client's claims. The allegation that the inmate's plea was involun-
tarily induced by false statements made by his attorney was difficult
to verify. However, there was evidence that the lawyer had exagger-
ated the possibility that the man would receive a more severe sen-
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tence if he went to trial. 26  It was likely that a false impression was
thereby created and that this was one of several factors which con-
vinced the man to plead guilty. 27 There was ample admissible evi-
dence of the inmate's guilt on several counts of burglary, and convic-
tion seemed certain if the case went to trial. The practice of the judge
who accepted the man's guilty plea and sentenced him was in fact to
impose a sentence of eight years on similar defendants, whether they
pleaded guilty or went to trial. It was true that the policeman who
testified to establish the factual basis for the plea did so for adminis-
trative convenience and had no personal knowledge of the crime. In
addition, the record of the "read-ins" was inadequate and did not
fully ensure that the man would not later be charged with those
crimes. The record did not adequately identify the crimes the inmate
acknowledged he committed.
Most importantly, the lawyer who represented the defendant be-
fore conviction did not adequately communicate to the client the
basis for his advice that the client plead guilty. Nor did defense coun-
sel adequately explain the nature of the proceedings. The client did
not fully understand the reasons for his lawyer's advice, nor was he
able to make an informed judgment about his best interests. The
client, later confused and frustrated, was bitter because he felt that
26. See Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role In Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1184, 1194
(1975). This article contains an illuminating discussion of the legal issues related to inflated
predictions of sentences by defense attorneys to induce clients to plead guilty.
27. See Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation
of a Profession, 1 LAW & Soc. REV. 15 (1967). The defense attorney may respond to the plea
bargaining situation by:
abandoning [his] ideological and professional commitments to the accused client, in
the service of ... [the] higher claims of the court organization. All court personnel,
included the accused's own lawyer, tend to be coopted to become agent-mediators
who help the accused redefine his situation and restructure his perceptions con-
comitant with a plea of guilty.
Id. at 19-20. See also Gard, supra note 17, and Mazor, supra note 17, for discussions of the
inappropriateness of "persuading" the client to plead guilty by failing to present the defendant
with full and accurate evaluations of his factual and legal situation. Commentators have often
been critical of the practice of plea bargaining. For the most part, they have called for abolition
or drastic reform. Among the most thoughtful articles are a number which raise the ethical and
moral difficulties that are part of the practice, and cite the important cases and previous com-
mentaries that are essential to a full understanding of the problems. See D. NEWMAN, CON-
VICTION (1966); Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1975); Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE
L. J. 1179 (1975); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50
(1968); Alsehuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Pt. 1, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059
(1976); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970); Note,
Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 865 (1964); Note, Plea Bargaining: The Case for Reform, 6 U. RIcH. L. REV. 325 (1972);
Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972).
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with adequate representation he would not have been convicted.
This, of course, was not true.
It is important for lawyers to avoid creating the belief that the
criminal justice system treats people unfairly. A confined person who
feels that he was convicted wrongly is understandably bitter, and is
often unresponsive to any correctional treatment and unwilling to par-
ticipate in constructive programs. This in turn affects when he is re-
leased on parole and how effectively he is reassimilated into society.
What is more troubling about Illustration 7 is the apparent view of
the lawyer that he should decide what is best for the client and then
persuade the client to follow his advice. The ultimate consequences of
such a view of professional responsibility are serious, for people will
quite rightly believe they have been treated unfairly. This is true
even when the ultimate conviction and sentence are inevitable.
The problem that arose in Illustration 7 should have been foreseen
by the attorney. What is not so obvious is that problems, seemingly
insignificant before conviction, often take on great importance after-
ward. Such problems, like credit for preconviction jail time, easily
can be avoided but often can be cured only at unnecessary expense to
the criminal justice system, as Illustration 8 indicates.
Illustration 8. The inmate said that the records clerk at the correc-
tional institution in which he was incarcerated was making an error
in the computation of his mandatory release and parole eligibility
dates. (His mandatory release date is the maximum time he may
serve after his good time is deducted; his parole eligibility date is
the date he becomes eligible for parole.)
According to the inmate, the judge said that in imposing sen-
tence he was giving the defendant credit for the five weeks he
spent in the county jail before sentencing. However, the inmate
said, the institution was not giving him such credit. If it did, he
concluded, his parole eligibility and mandatory release dates would
be five weeks earlier. He asked that his sentence be corrected to
reflect this credit.
In jurisdictions where credit for preconviction custody or "jail
time" is not automatically credited and where the sentencing court
has the discretion to credit such time toward the defendant's sen-
tence, there is little uniformity in the practice of judges. In Illustra-
tion 8, the judge had stated on the record that he was crediting the
jail time by imposing a less than maximum sentence. This practice is
no longer proper in Wisconsin, but it once was a source of confusion
among inmates. 28  The judgment of conviction and sentence said
28. Credit for pre-conviction jail time served because of indigency in now mandatorily cred-
ited in Wisconsin. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1977); Klimas v. State, 75 Wis.2d
244, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977). The issue was governed by Byrd v. State, 65 Wis.2d 415, 222
N.W.2d 696 (1974), at the time this case arose.
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nothing about such credit, nor did the defense lawyer mention credit
at sentencing. The district attorney had argued that the defendant
should not receive credit. The institution records office had computed
the man's parole eligibility date and mandatory release date asthough
the man had received no such credit. This was consistent with the
judgment form.
The inmate felt that the judge had not been honest with him, for
he had promised credit and not delivered, at least not to the man's
satisfaction. The prosecutor acted unfairly, the man thought, because
he had served time and, as he said, "time is time." His defense
lawyer, the man felt, should have argued strenuously for the credit.
In fact, the lawyer did not regard the five weeks as important given
the sentence imposed. The man's sense of injustice was exacerbated
by the fact that many inmates at the institution to which he was sen-
tenced had received shorter sentences than he for similar crimes and
yet received credit for their preconviction confinement.
In some of the Illustrations in this section, the lawyer failed to
adequately represent his client from the client's point of view. This
does not necessarily mean that the conduct did not comply with ac-
cepted standards of competency within the profession. To state that
clients are unhappy and that their complicated problems are not re-
solved is not to conclude that the lawyer has a responsibility to help
solve them. However, client needs ought to be an important factor in
defining the profession's standards of competent representation. And,
certainly, clients ought to be involved in deciding what is in their
interests, not told what is best for them.
My own view is that lawyers for the poor and disadvantaged are
members of a helping profession and that the client's needs are of
primary consideration in defining responsibility. When the criminal
client's needs bear directly on the ultimate goal of successful reinte-
gration into the community or affect the quality of life while confined
or the helpfulness of the correctional process, the lawyer should be
responsive. A lawyer who fails to do so is analogous to a doctor who
treats only one of several maladies from which a patient is suffering:
one sickness may be cured, but the patient does not get better.
One may ask why the lawyer should have responsibility for what,
perhaps, has traditionally been considered to be social work concerns.
The lawyer is in a position to help identify and solve many of the
problems collateral to the criminal charge which a client may have.
As is apparent from the Illustrations in this Article that the lawyer is
often in a position to deal with many of these problems, related as so
many are to the fact or consequences of conviction and confinement.
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Of course, working on all of a client's problems may not always be
the most efficient use of the lawyer's time. He can delegate responsi-
bility to paralegals; legal aid agencies might properly have social
workers on their staffs to be of assistance; and the appropriate gov-
ernment agencies can be enlisted to help clients. As the illustrations
suggest, the cost of inattentiveness is high.
C. Understand the Way the Systems
Operate in Action
Three of the most prominent characteristics of the criminal justice
and mental health systems are their complexity, their fragmentation,
and the importance of the exercise of discretion in their administra-
tion. These characteristics make prediction of what will happen to
clients at later stages in the system difficult but not always impossi-
ble. One who is familiar with the system can usually predict future
options and the factors which will bear on the exercise of these op-
tions.
Lawyers who represent, prosecute, and judge people against whom
criminal or commitment proceedings have been started, need to un-
derstand how the "systems" operate. 29 This is different from under-
standing fully the impact of consequences which I have already dis-
cussed. It is not only important to know the results of advice, it is
also important to understand the process by which they are or are not
achieved.
The two examples which follow examine in some detail how the
system operated for two people. They illustrate that intimate knowl-
edge of the system is necessary to fully advise clients of the possible
consequences of particular decisions in order to effectively represent
them.
Illustration 9. A woman at a Wisconsin correctional institution had
received a one-year sentence for forgery. In response to a question
as to whether there were any detainers filed or outstanding charges
pending against her in any jurisdiction, she replied that she be-
lieved that a federal warrant had been issued for her arrest for
29. Jerome Frank was one of the first proponents of giving law students direct field experi-
ence in order to deepen their insight into the structure, operations, and goals of the legal
system. His focus, however, was on courts rather than other segments of the criminal justice or
mental health systems. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 233 (Atheneum ed. 1963). Others who
have described the need for direct experience with a social or legal institution in order to fully
understand its functioning include Gorman, Clinical Legal Education: A Prospectus, 44 S. CAL.
L. REv. 537 (1971); Peden, The Role of Practical Training in Legal Education: The American
and Australian Experience, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503 (1972); Wright, The Need for Education in
the Law of Criminal Correction, 2 VAL. U. L. REv. 84 (1967).
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forgery in Alaska. Although this warrant had not been filed as a
detainer at the institution, it subsequently was filed. Her trial at-
torney had assured her that Alaska would never pursue such a
charge if she were confined in Wisconsin, and he did nothing
about it. The client was worried about the charge.
The failure to resolve the detainer at an early stage in the Wiscon-
sin proceedings had two serious consequences.30 First, it limited the
alternatives and leverage of the client to resolve it. Second, it affected
the correctional treatment available to the client, the length of her
stay in the institution, and her ability to be successfully reassimilated
into society. Her trial attorney, who advised her to plead guilty in
Wisconsin, might have worked out a plan to dispose of both the fed-
eral and the state charges at the same time. Perhaps the federal pros-
ecutor would have demanded that she receive a sentence in excess of
one year in Wisconsin in exchange for dismissal of the Alaska charge.
This at least would have allowed her to serve all her time in one
correctional system, which would have enhanced both her chance to
participate in programs and the likelihood of parole. It also would
have reduced the uncertainty, frustration, and sense of injustice the
client felt.
Other options were lost by the failure to dispose of the problem
before trial in Wisconsin. Wisconsin law provides that a person may
be permitted to serve a Wisconsin sentence in another state's institu-
tion if the sentencing court so directs. 31 Had the United States At-
torney insisted that the client face charges in Alaska, the defendant
could have attempted to dispose of the federal charge first and then
asked the Wisconsin sentencing judge to permit her to serve her
Wisconsin sentence in a federal institution. Or, under federal law,
she might have been permitted to serve her federal sentence in Wis-
consin. 32  Of course, her leverage with the United States Attorney
was reduced by her conviction and confinement in Wisconsin.
The uncertainty as to whether the client ultimately would serve a
sentence in Alaska had an adverse psychological effect. 33  She found
30. For a discussion of detainer law, see Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976); Braden v.
Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393
U.S. 374 (1969); United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975); D.
WEXLER, THE LAW OF DETAINERS (1973); Tuttle, Catch 2254: Federal Jurisdiction and Inter-
State Detainers, 32 U. PITT. L. REv. 489 (1971); Wexler & Hershey, Criminal Detainers in a
Nutshell, 7 CriM. L. BULL. 753 (1971); Note, Effective Guarantee of a Speedy Trial for Con-
victs in other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J. 767 (1968).
31. WIS. STAT. § 973.15 (1975).
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565-3569 (1970).
33. The effects of a detainer on the prisoner's psychological state and on the ability of in-
stitutional staff to plan for rehabilitation are described in Dickey & Remington, supra note 5, at
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it difficult to adjust to the institution, and felt no incentive to partici-
pate in any institutional programs in Wisconsin.
Even if this inmate had desired to participate in programs, the de-
tainer made her ineligible for many. Her short sentence made her a
good candidate for a work-release program which would have enabled
her to earn money, leave the institution daily, and enhance her
chances for an early parole. But she was ineligible because of the
detainer, according to the rules of the Division of Corrections. 34
Under these rules, the inmate was also ineligible for a minimum
security classification which would have permitted her to have more
comfortable living arrangements and more freedom within the institu-
tion. Furthermore, her social worker informed her that she probably
would serve until mandatory release, because it was impossible to
work out a satisfactory parole plan in Wisconsin due to the possibility
that she might have to go to an institution in Alaska upon her release.
Thus, the effect of the detainer was to frustrate not only the client
but the correctional process as Well and to reduce the chances for the
successful reassimilation of the offender in the community upon
parole release.
In Illustration 9, discretion was exercised by the United States At-
torney. He permitted the client to plead guilty to the federal charge,
and she received a one-year concurrent sentence. Discretion is
perhaps the single most prominent characteristic of the criminal jus-
tice system. 35  It is exercised at virtually every stage-by the police
officer who decides whether to arrest, the prosecutor who decides
whether to charge, the judge who determines the appropriate sen-
tence, and the parole board who decides when an inmate is to be
released. It is important that lawyers understand the significance of
discretion, how its exercise affects the system and the people in it,
how it may be limited, and what the role of the lawyer may be in
ensuring that discretion is properly exercised. The following Illustra-
tion indicates that it is important for lawyers to understand the sig-
nificance of discretion.
184-88. See also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967); Brendes, The Detainer Agreement, 14 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 257 (1968); Dauber,
Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 CRim. L. BULL. 669 (1971).
34. See Rules for Work and Study Release, Promulgated 1977 by the Wisconsin Division of
Corrections.
35. For a general discussion of the operations and problems of discretion in the criminal
justice system, see AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, Discretion, in STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE 124-44; M. COHEN, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1967);
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1971); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMI-
NARY INQUIRY (1969); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (1976);
Wexler, Discretion: The Unacknowledged Side of Law, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 120 (1975).
[Vol. 27:407
LEGAL SERVICES
Illustration 10. An inmate said that he was not being treated fairly
by the parole board. He had served 18 months of a 6 year sentence
for robbery. The inmate stated that he had a good disciplinary rec-
ord, that he had gotten his General Equivalency Degree while at
the institution, and was working in the auto body shop "with no
problems."
The parole board had just issued the man his second 12-month
deferral, the maximum deferral given by the board. The inmate
was notified of the decision by a form with a checkmark next to the
statements that "Release at this time would depreciate the serious-
ness of the offense" and "Release is not appropriate because of
prior poor adjustment while under supervision." The inmate
thought that his "record" warranted immediate parole.
A major concern of defendants and confined people in jurisdictions
with indeterminate sentencing systems is when they will be released.
To fully advise clients who are considering a plea of guilty in anticipa-
tion of a particular sentence, it is important to understand the parole
process. Unfortunately, this process is not understood well by in-
mates or lawyers. This often leads to unnecessary confusion and bit-
terness among inmates because their unrealistic expectations are not
fulfilled.
The exercise of discretion at the parole hearing is of great impor-
tance to the inmate.36 This decision dictates the immediate future of
the person considered for parole and determines whether he will re-
main in the institution indefinitely or be given a short deferment,
indicating that he will be paroled in the near future. Many factors are
considered in making the parole decision:3 7 the severity of the of-
36. The New York Special Commission on Attica, Attica (1972), concluded that a major fac-
tor contributing to prisoner discontent at the time of the 1971 riot was uncertainty regarding
parole dates. A letter to the governor from 10 Fox Lake, Wisconsin Correctional Institution
inmates shortly after a prison disturbance in June, 1977, indicated that one of the reasons for
the riot was dissatisfaction about the small number of prisoners being paroled, and suspicion on
the part of inmates that the Parole Board was denying release in order to keep the prisons filled
to capacity and thereby "fatten the budget for the Division of Corrections." One of the most
articulate descriptions of the anxiety brought about by parole appearances can be found in M.
BRALY, FALSE STARTS: A MEMOIR OF SAN QUENTIN AND OTHER PRISONS 251 (1976). See also
Coleman, The Crime of Treatment, 2 PSYCH. OPINION 5 (1974).
37. Parole decisions are often based on scanty information obtained at the time of commit-
ment. During confinement, information regarding changes in the individual is also inadequate.
See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). For information regarding the types of
criteria parole boards should or do use, see K. DAVIS, Discretion and the U.S. Parole Board, in
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 126-33 (1969); ROBISON, ROBISON, KINGSNORTH & INMAN, BY THE
STANDARD OF HIS REHABILITATION (1970); Kingsnorth, Decision-Making in a Parole Board
Bureaucracy, 6 J. OF RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 210 (1969). See also Advisory
Council on Parole, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, GUIDES FOR PAROLE
SELECTION (1963); Boiler, Preparing Prisoners for Their Return to the Community, 30 FED.
PROB. 43 (1966); Gottfredson, Comparing and Combining Subjective and Objective Parole Pre-
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fense, the length of sentence, the person's disciplinary and work or
school record in the institution, his past criminal record, the situation
he will return to in the community if paroled, rumors about the man
in the institution, the parole board's judgment of the person's
dangerousness, the likelihood that he will commit another crime if
released at the time, and the reaction in the community from which
the person came if he is paroled.
Clear standards and guidelines for the parole decision are neces-
sary. In trying to determine what an inmate had "to do" to be
paroled, we found that there were no written standards for the criti-
cal decision on parole other than the conclusions on the deferral
form. 3 8  It was impossible to know what criteria the board considered
relevant to its decision. Judicial review39 of the deferral decision is
usually not feasible. The standard for review makes it unlikely that the
board's decision will be overturned. Moreover, judicial review is time
consuming and costly, and would not ensure fairness before the
parole board. The board should issue clear, written parole standards
to inmates, and inmates should have access to the information the
board considered, an opportunity to present evidence, and a full writ-
ten explanation of the decision.
dictions, Cal. Dept. of Correction Research Newsletter (Sept.-Dec. 1961). Articles on clinical
and statistical methods for setting release dates and their degrees of success include: Evjen,
Current Thinking on Parole Prediction Tables, 8 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 215 (1962); Glaser,
The Efficacy of Alternative Approaches to Parole Prediction, 20 AM. Soc. REv. 283 (1955);
Hakeem, Prediction of Parole Outcome from Summaries of Case Histories, 52 J. CuM. L.C. &
P.S. 145 (1961); and Savides, A Parole Success Prediction Study, Cal. Dept. of Correction Re-
search Newsletter (Sept.-Dec. 1961).
38. See Chappell, The Lawyer's Role in the Administration of Probation and Parole, 48
A.B.A.J. 742 (1962); Jacobs, Parole: An Interest in Due Process, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 205 (1976);
Merrit, Due Process in Parole Granting: A Current Assessment, 10 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. &
PRoc. 93 (1976); Note, Applicability of Due Process and State Freedom of Information Acts to
Parole Release Hearings, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1011 (1976). For a view of parole proceedings
that concentrate on factors aside from fairness to the inmates, see Dell'apa, Adams, Jorgensen
and Sigurdson, Advocacy, Brokerage, Community: The ABC's of Probation and Parole, 40 FED.
PROB. 37 (1976) and Karsh, Release Hearings: To Protect the Public!, 40 FED. PROB. 55 (1976).
Dictum in State v. Goulette, 65 Wis.2d 207, 222 N.W.2d 622 (1974) declined to comment on
the adequacy of parole hearings and the standards applied because the court had been informed
that the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services was "in the process of formulat-
ing, in written form, the procedures and standards to be used by the Parole Board .... " Those
written standards turned out to be the conclusory guidelines printed on the "Parole Board
Decision" which is checked and handed to each inmate as notice of the decision. Reasons for
not granting parole include: (1) parole would depreciate the seriousness of the criminal be-
havior; (2) there is a reasonable probability that the inmate will not comply with the require-
ments of parole; (3) continued confinement is necessary to protect the public from further
criminal activity; and (4) the inmate needs treatment that cannot be provided adequately or
safely outside prison.
39. See State v. Goulette, 65 Wis.2d 207, 222 N.W.2d 622 (1974).
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However, fairness depends on many factors, over many of which
the board has no control. The board cannot make available programs
which, if the inmate participated in an appropriate way, would im-
prove his chances for parole. For example, it is an empty promise to
say that a person will be paroled if he completes high school, when
the person cannot be admitted to the correctional institution's high
school due to overcrowding. The parole board has no control over
such a problem. This is an example of the fragmented nature of de-
cisionmaking in the system.
Knowledge of the parole process, then, is important to advise
clients effectively. Without a feeling for the criteria for parole release
and how an inmate can satisfy them, the client is unable to fully
understand the consequences of a particular sentence. It also frus-
trates the correctional process if inmates feel that they are being
treated unfairly.
D. The Ability to Exercise Good Judgment to
Further Client Interests
An assumption implicit in this Article is that lawyers need knowl-
edge of substantive and procedural law in order to be effective. But
substantive knowledge may be to no avail unless it can be marshalled
in an effective way. Conventional wisdom is that the missing element
here is skill: the ability to interview and communicate, to write, to
question witnesses or to convince people of the validity of one's posi-
tion.4 0
What may not be so apparent is that lawyers also need that elusive
quality, good judgment, in order to be effective. The ability to iden-
tify an integrated legal problem, analyze the alternatives and their
implications, and make an intelligent judgment about its resolution is
40. Many writers who support clinical legal education do so largely because they see it as an
effective way to teach the far-ranging skills a lawyer needs in practice, from client interviewing
and counseling to litigation design, as well as the more traditional skills of legal research and
writing. See, e.g., Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 1 (1973);
Bellow & Johnson, Reflections on the University of Southern California Clinical Semester, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 664 (1971); Brown, Teaching the Low Visible Decision Processes of the Lawyer,
25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 386 (1973); Cleary, Law Students in Criminal Law Practice, 16 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1 (1966); Dauer, Expanding Clinical Teaching Methods into the Commercial Law Cur-
riculum, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76 (1973); Dutile, Criminal Law and Procedure-Bringing It
Home, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 106 (1973); Grismer & Shaffer, Experience-Based Teaching Methods
in Legal Counseling, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 448 (1970); Kessler, Clerkship as a Means of
Skills-Training, 11 J. LEGAL EDuc. 482 (1959); Meltsner, Clinical Education at Columbia: The
Columbia Legal Assistance Resource, 24 J. LEGAL EDuc. 237 (1972); Shaffer, What Most
Lawyers Do for a Living Law Students Are Seldom Taught, 1 LEARNING & L. 40 (1974); Sym-
posium, The Merging of Professor and Practitioner, 1 LEARNING & L. 8 (1974).
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of critical importance to the client. It also is important to be able to
judge when law reform is inconsistent with a client's best interests.
Illustration 11. The inmate indicated that he had pleaded guilty to
burglary and attempted theft and had received sentences of two
years for each offense, to be served consecutively. The inmate
stated that he had broken into a store that sold stereo equipment
and was apprehended while picking the lock which led to the room
where equipment was stored. He said that he entered the building
with the intention of stealing equipment. The inmate also indicated
that he had admitted committing several other burglaries and that
these crimes were "read-in," pursuant to the plea agreement,
when he pleaded guilty to the two crimes of which he was con-
victed.
The student who assisted the client alertly raised the question of
whether the inmate's conviction on two offenses arising from the
same set of facts was a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, i.e.,
whether attempted theft was a lesser included offense of burglary. 4'
Research on the question indicated that the issue was undecided
under that particular statutory scheme. The case thus offered an op-
portunity for law reform.
The question of whether to attempt to withdraw the guilty plea and
to raise the double jeopardy issue on appeal was a difficult one. The
inmate was reluctant to appeal, even after the student explained that
one of his sentences might be vacated if the appeal were successful.
What, asked the inmate, about "read-ins?" If his conviction for at-
tempted theft were vacated, would he be tried on the "read-in"
charges? Most importantly, could his overall sentence be increased if
he were so convicted? 42 He had, after all, admitted to the other
offenses in open court. Could those admissions be used against him at
a later trial? For a variety of reasons, the client decided to withdraw
his guilty plea to attempted theft. Before reaching this decision, the
student and client had to resolve these questions.
In this case, the client had entered his plea of guilty pursuant to a
plea agreement. The student and client were thus forced to confront
the question of whether the client should renege on the plea agree-
ment. The client was reluctant to do so. To be sure, the judge could
have simply sentenced the client to four years of confinement for the
41. See Wis. STAT. §§ 939.32(2), 943.20(1)(a), and 943.10(1) for definitions of attempt, theft,
and burglary respectively. See also State v. Hall, 53 Wis.2d 719, 193 N.W.2d 653 (1972) (intent
to steal will not be inferred from breaking and entering alone).
42. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); WEXLER, The Risks of Seeking Relief
from a Criminal Conviction, in CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRISON INMATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE
(1973); Aplin, Sentence Increases on Retrial After North Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U. CINN. L.
REV. 427 (1970).
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single offense of burglary and dismissed the other charges. The client
initially felt that his "deal" had been "four years for everything."
In this case, the student felt that an opportunity to litigate a case
involving significant legal reform was a factor in favor of appeal. This
raised the issue of the responsibility of the attorney in a situation
where the client's interest did not coincide with the value of law re-
form.
What is the "right thing" to do in such a case? Should the client
live up to the plea agreement which, in a sense, was freely and
knowledgeably made? Did the multiple convictions violate the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause thereby making the plea of guilty an involuntary
one? Is law reform more important than what is best for this client? Is
it in the best interest of this client that he live up to his agreements?
Who should decide these questions? In my experience, to say that
the client should decide is an oversimplification, for the client invari-
ably asks the lawyer what he should do. Lawyers confront integrated
problems of this type every day. The lawyer must analyze the prob-
lem and the implications of alternative solutions, make a judgment,
communicate with the client, and resolve it effectively.
Lawyers need skills to be effective, but they also need the ability
to exercise sound judgment to help clients with complicated prob-
lems. The exercise of such judgment requires the integration of the
qualities described in this Article, knowledge of substantive and pro-
cedural law, the ability to analyze problems in all their complexity,
and the skill to bring about the desired result once that is known.
III. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR DEVELOPING THE
QUALITIES NEEDED TO SERVE CLIENTS
If my conclusions are correct about the qualities needed to serve
the clients of the legal profession effectively, a logical question is how
lawyers' service to clients can be enhanced. Several different re-
sponses may be called for.
First, we need to know more about the nature and scope of the
difficulties which clients confront. 43 We ought not restrict the iden-
tification of problems to the needs that clients identify, for clients
often do not know what difficulties are susceptible to legal assistance.
If lawyers identify additional needs, follow-up is imperative to deter-
mine their effects on the clients, to analyze whether the clients were
really aided or whether other solutions would have been more help-
ful, and to determine what effects the advice will have. The univer-
43. Some such work has already been done. See Dickey & Remington, supra note 4.
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sity, the law school, and the legal profession have a responsibility to
answer such questions so that society is better served by the profes-
sion.
The Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance Program has two rel-
evant studies under way at the present time. The first is a study of
the presentence reports in which several questions are being ad-
dressed: (1) Do lawyers discuss presentence reports with clients? (2)
Do reports often contain errors? (3) To what extent do errors affect
sentences? (4) How do inmates feel, after a period of confinement,
about the way their lawyers represented them at sentencing?
The second study inquires into the role of defense lawyers in the
decision to commit people as incompetent to stand trial. The attempt
is to determine to what extent clients and their lawyers agree on the
appropriateness of commitment and to understand the clients' percep-
tion of the fairness of the process.
Further thought ought to be given to the structuring of lawyers'
offices, particularly public defender and legal aid offices. If the prob-
lems of clients are as complex and interrelated as this Article
suggests, creating separate offices to handle "criminal" problems and
"civil" problems may be an inadequate type of organization. Such di-
vision of responsibility may inhibit the identification and effective
resolution of clients' problems. Another possible need is for para-
professionals to function in the public sector as they do in the private
sector.
In addition, continuing education of the bar ought to be responsive
to the real needs of the profession. A lawyer's education surely does
not end when he finishes law school. The development of a lawyer's
ability is an ongoing process. Continuing education should provide
help in making refinements. The Department of Law of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Extension has had several programs for lawyers
which stress full service to clients. Members of its staff are in the
process of developing written materials on the responsibility of the
lawyer to the client at sentencing.
Finally, undergraduate legal education should develop the neces-
sary insight, knowledge, understanding, and abilities of students that
will improve the profession's service to clients. Legal education ought
to be responsive to the profession's and clients' needs. Presently, lit-
tle stress in law school is given to developing the student's ability to
ascertain a client's needs and interest; 44 more is given to the acquisi-
44. See Brown, The Education of Potential Clients, 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1951); Marks, A
Lawyer's Duty to Take all Comers and Many who Do Not Come, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 915
(1976); Shaffer, Christina Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 721
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tion of knowledge of the kind needed to serve the client and some is
given to the ability to use knowledge effectively to help clients. 45 But
whether these abilities are developed is fortuitous, depending to a
great extent on the circumstances of the new lawyer's work. Yet the
need for these abilities is as great as is the need for the lawyer to
acquire knowledge.
One way for the law school to do this is to offer courses that pro-
vide students with the opportunity to understand the consequences of
commitment and conviction; to think about the responsibility of the
lawyer to the client and the implications of advice; to understand the
way that systems-criminal justice, mental health, and bureaucracies
in general-work in action; and to develop other skills that lawyers
use, particularly the ability to confront integrated legal problems of
the type lawyers face. The development of good judgment can only
come when the lawyer has the exposure to clients, their problems,
and the system.
The Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance to Correctional In-
mates and Mental Patients Program (WLAP) is an example of a pro-
gram designed to improve the lawyer's ability to deliver high quality
(1975). For the various roles a lawyer can play aside from litigator, see H. FREEMAN & H.
WEIHOFEN, CLINICAL LEGAL TRAINING 169-83 (1972); Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON,
LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 106 (1967); Brown, The Law Office: A Preventive Law Labora'ory,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 940 (1956); Schwartz, The Missing Rule of Professional Conduct, 52 L.A.B.
BULL. 10 (1976); T. PARSONS noted in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 382 (1954) that "the
social role and function of the lawyer can be therapeutic, helping his client psychologically in
giving him necessary emotional support at critical times."
45. Southwestern University School of Law has an experimental program called "Southwest-
ern's Conceptual Approach to Legal Education" which attempts to equip lawyers to effectively
represent clients by developing the qualities outlined here. Dean Boyack of Southwestern de-
scribed the problem to which the program responds in this way:
The bench and the bar are saying that the students never see the total client prob-
lem because the client problem is never part of one course. . . . In real life a client
does not appear with a label saying, "I am a tort problem." It takes one to three
years after law school for a student to cut his teeth on clients. He learns the law
through rough experience.
Watkins, At a School in California Students Learn the Law Without the Casebook, 14 The
Chronicle of Higher Education 21 (Aug. 1, 1977.)
Works dealing with the subject of education for professional competence in general, many of
which cite the advantages of clinical education for the purpose, include: J. STONE, LEGAL EDU-
CATION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF THE BOULDER CON-
FERENCE ON THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS FOR THEIR PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES 1956 (1959);
Brown & Brown, What Counsels the Counselor? The Code of Professional Responsibility's Ethi-
cal Considerations-A Preventive Law Analysis, 10 VAL. U. L. REv. 453 (1976); Greenbaum &
Parsloe, Roles and Relations in Legal Practice, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 228 (1976) (reporting on a
non-clinical method for teaching these subjects); Smith, Is Education for Professional Responsi-
bility Possible? 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 509 (1968); Strebeigh, Watergate and the Law School, or
Can Legal Ethics Be Taught?, 1975 Yale Alumni Magazine 20 (January, 1975); Watson, Some
Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 CINN. L. REv. 93 (1968).
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legal services to clients. The program seeks to teach students to iden-
tify and understand a client's problems and best interests; to teach
the student substantive and procedural law, as well as how the law
works in action; and to enable the student to apply his ability to serve
the client.4 6 An Appendix to this Article fully describes this program
and the educational philosophy which underlies it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Effective assistance to clients requires that lawyers have particular
qualities and skills. Lawyers must be able to ascertain which client
problems can be relieved by legal assistance. This requires a knowl-
edge and interest in people, as well as an ability to help clients define
their problems. Lawyers must also have knowledge of substantive and
procedural law. Finally, the lawyer must be able to bring the knowl-
edge to bear in the resolution of client problems.
More specifically, and with particular reference to serving clients
such as correctional inmates and confined mental patients, lawyers
need to understand the impact the criminal justice and mental health
systems have on the accused, the convicted and the involuntarily
committed. Without an understanding of the alternatives available to
clients and their consequences, it is impossible to render adequate
assistance. Lawyers also need to define their responsibility to their
clients. This responsibility in the past has not extended to the needs
and concerns of the whole client. As a consequence, lawyers have
terminated their representation of people who continue to require
assistance to resolve their legal problems. Effective legal assistance
cannot be rendered without an understanding of how the system op-
erates, for decisions' which may at one point seem helpful may later
turn out to be not in a client's best interest. Finally, lawyers need
skill and good judgment to help clients, and this requires experience
with people and their complex problems.
These conclusions suggest several possible courses of action. The
profession and its clients would be greatly aided by further research
into clients' needs and how lawyers could better serve them. The
46. For educational programs which see this type of direct institutional experience as a
primary purpose see Casad, The Kansas Trial Judge Clerkship Program, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75
(1965); Everett, The Duke Law School Legal Internship Project, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 185 (1965);
Kimball, Correctional Internships-A Wisconsin Experience in Education for Professional Re-
sponsibility, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 86 (1965); Oliphant, Law Students in the Lower Courts, Hen-
nepin County, Minnesota, 7 CLEPR Newsletter 1 (March, 1973); Wilson, Legal Assistance Pro-
ject at Leavenworth, 24 NLDA BRIEFCASE 254 (1966).
A number of clinical programs operating in prisons and jails are described in 3 CLEPR
Newsletter (November,.1970) & 4 CLEPR Newsletter (May, 1972).
[Vol. 27:407
1977] LEGAL SERVICES
organization of lawyers' offices might be altered to insure that the
whole client is served. And, of course, continuing legal education and
undergraduate education should include opportunities to develop the
knowledge and abilities I have identified as useful to clients.
I have also identified one program-the Wisconsin Law School
Legal Assistance to Correctional Inmates and Mental Health Patients
Program-that is responsive to the client and professional needs
which I have identified. Such programs have special strengths and
require particular structure and resources to be effective.
APPENDIX
Legal Education Designed to Develop the Ability to Serve Clients Effectively:
The Wisconsin Law School Legal Assistance Program (WLAP)
WLAP has two primary and complementary purposes: first, the education of law students and
second providing legal services to correctional inmates and confined mental health patients. The
primary educational goals of the program are to develop the qualities discussed in detail at
pages 411 to 437. Additional educational objectives include the development of knowledge of
substantive and procedural law and of analytical and writing abilities.
Staffed each semester by thirty-five to fifty students, six attorneys, and two law professor-at-
torneys, WLAP provides legal services to correctional inmates and mental health patients in all
state adult correctional and mental health institutions and the Federal Correctional Institution at
Oxford, Wisconsin. Under the supervision of attorneys, the students interview every inmate and
patient upon his admission to the institution at a "diagnostic interview." Inmates and patients
who are already confined are interviewed at their request and whenever necessary during the
course of representation. At these interviews, great stress is given to the identification of all the
potential client's problems which a person trained in law could help resolve. All of the cases
used in the illustrations in this Article were encountered by lawyers and students working in
WLAP
Students are required to write a memorandum which sets out the facts of each of their cases,
identifies client problems and potential legal issues and presents proposed solutions. After this
memorandum is reviewed by a supervising attorney and the course of action agreed upon, the
student works toward the resolution of client problems. This often involves further factual inves-
tigation, writing simple letters, legal research and writing, consultation with other attorneys,
negotiation with other parties, and so on. Students typically work on 25 and 30 cases each per
semester.
The legal needs of confined people fall into three broad categories. The first category relates
to the fact and duration of confinement. Confined people need assistance to appeal their convic-
tions, to bring federal habeas corpus or to otherwise collaterally attack the conviction or com-
mitment; to modify their sentences and the conditions of their commitment; to help them de-
cide whether to appeal; and to answer their questions about sentence computation, parole
policies and other procedural matters. Second, confined people and their families need the
assistance of legally trained people to deal with social and economic problems such as debts and
support obligations, tax problems, social security and health benefits, and licensing problems.
Attention needs to be directed to social and economic problems which bear on the ultimate
reassimilation of the person into the community, including resolution of detainers. A last cate-
gory of legal needs relates to the conditions of confinement. An inmate or patient may require
help, for example, in seeking judicial review of confinement conditions in federal court via 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or the use of the administrative grievance procedure. WLAP assists confined
people with all of these problems, either by direct representation or by referral to the approp-
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riate agency, such as the State Public Defender or Corrections Legal Services, a law firm
created to represent confined people in so-called "1983" actions.
In addition to intensive individualized instruction by the supervising attorney (who meets
with each student individually for two hours each week and must review and approve all actions
taken in behalf of a client, including all written work before it leaves the office), each student
visits an institution for eight full days per semester to interview clients and attends 12 hours of
orientation classes at the beginning of each semester and a seminar with four to eight other
students each week. An optional meeting of the whole group also meets each week, usually with
a guest speaker, such as a warden or judge, to address problems of mutual interest and concern.
A. Teaching Law Students what Lawyers Should Know:
The Importance of Experience
How can we teach law students what good lawyers should know so that professionally respon-
sible, high quality services are provided to the client? 47 This question has no simple answer.
Too often discussion of "clinical" education focuses on teaching methods. The critical point that
is overlooked by such focus is that teaching methods should be adjusted to suit the particular
47. Another problem with much of the debate on the subject is the type of "either-or"
analysis which views "clinical" courses as helter-skelter, relatively untutored experience un-
trammelled by any substantive learning. Allen expresses fear in The Prospects of University Law
Training, 63 A.B.A.J. 346 (1977) that "American legal education is confronted by the rise of a
new anti-intellectualism," id., although he submits that "'increased emphasis on practical skills
becomes a threat to university training only when it ignores the broad range of values and social
interests that legal education is called on to cultivate." Id. at 349. Redlich, Perceptions of a
Clinical Program, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 574 (1971), reports on a clinical program plagued by
disorganization, lack of adequate supervision, and also harmed by the failure to provide students
with theoretical underpinnings for their work. For other important criticisms of the concepts
underlying clinical legal education see Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: Why Has it Failed,
in KITCH, CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 54 (1970); Gorman,
Clinical Legal Education: A Prospectus, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 537 (1971) (expressing fear that
unless clinical programs opening all avenues of experience for students are developed it is
doubtful that such programs will become a significant feature of legal education). On the other
hand, supporters of clinical legal education point out that carefully designed and executed expe-
riential law programs do not have the flaws that critics dwell on. See, e.g., B. BOYER & R.
CRAMTON, ABF RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS-RESEARCH ON LEGAL EDUCATION (1974); COUN-
CIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR
THE LAW STUDENT 35 (1973); Bellow & Johnson, Reflections on the University of Southern
California Clinical Semester, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 664 (1971); Binder, Education Versus Service,
in CLEPR Conference Proceedings, Buck Hill Falls, 1973; Grossman, supra; LaFrance, Clinical
Education: "To Turn Ideals into Effective Vision," 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 624 (1971); Moulton,
Clinical Education: As Much Theory as Practice, Harv. L. Sch. Bull. 16 (October, 1972).
Other- commentators point out that clinical education is not meant to replace other modes of
legal education, but rather to enrich them. See, e.g., PINCUS, Legal Education In A Service
Setting, in COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CLINICAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 27 (1973); Seymour, The Advocate's View, 50 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 434 (1976); Symposium, The Merging of Professor and Practitioner, I LEARNING & L.
8, 71 (1974). In answer to those critics who feel that the benefits adduced for clinical legal
education can more properly be gained once the student becomes a practitioner, some legal
educators assert that professional standards of competency are best established "before the
forces of the everyday world have a chance to depress standards of performance." Educational
Values of Clinical Experience for Law Students, 2 CLEPR Newsletter 29 (September, 1969).
See also BRICKMAN, CLEPR and Clinical Education: A Review and Analysis, in COUNCIL ON
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW
STUDENT (1973); Conrad, Letter from the Law Clinic, 6 CLEPR Newsletter 1 (November,
1963).
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goals sought to be achieved. There is a spectrum of teaching methods that are appropriate in
law school, including the Socratic method, lecture, seminar, casebook method, hornbook
method, and the course which includes a field component.
In the criminal justice field, field components may include observation of the parole board,
police ride-alongs, attendance at a civil commitment hearing or the rendering of legal assistance
to institutionalized persons, depending upon the goals of the course. The existence, nature and
structure of the field component should depend upon the subject matter of the course and its
specific educational goals. 48 It would be silly, for example, to suggest that a student studying
conflicts of law should go and observe the boundaries between states. The importance of ob-
serving the police in action, understanding of the function of the police and the kinds of prob-
lems they encounter is obvious.
An assumption underlying WLAP is that experience can be a significant ingredient in the
achievement of some important law school educational goals. Students can understand the na-
ture of the problems of confined people by talking with them and by attempting to resolve their
problems rather than by simply reading about them. 49 Observing, experiencing, and discussing
real problems are very effective learning experiences. "Mere learning," the ability to repeat
what one has read or heard, does not prepare students to handle real problems. A person who
"really learns," on the other hand, can apply his knowledge and has a base on which to extend
his insight. He has, in a sense, learned how to learn or to teach himself. One way of acquiring
knowledge which can be applied and built upon is through a properly structured experience of
providing legal services to confined people.
Many students who start in the program fail to identify issues, not because they do not know
they are there, but because their ignorance of how to resolve them creates an unwillingness to
try. They fear the unknown; they fear failure. This stunts their curiosity and growth. 50 Given
the confidence that success and experience in dealing with people often brings, many become
increasingly willing to try to teach themselves and to develop their ability to solve problems
independently.
Another value of courses which expose students to clients and their problems-to the law in
action-is that they are a helpful way to increase sensitivity to the needs of clients and a
person's role in meeting these needs. And, two not inconsistent goals of legal education are to
make the student sensitive as well as cerebral.
The effectiveness and importance of WLAP in achieving its goals are difficult to measure. My
conclusion that WLAP is an effective way to develop important lawyers' qualities is based on
observation and feedback from students and former students now in practice. If what WLAP
seeks to teach is "learned better," it is not possible to "prove" that the substantive knowledge
and sense of professional responsibility is retained by the lawyer in practice. Prolonged expo-
sure to the problems of poor people can wear a person's sensitivity away and develop a ten-
dency to ignore a person's less immediate problems. In addition, there are strong pressures to
act in ways different from the way WLAP tries to train lawyers. For example, an appointed
attorney's fee in a criminal case may be paid by the county and need to be approved by the
judge who appointed him. If the judge does not believe that the lawyer should concern himself
with problems collateral to the criminal charge like detainers or family problems, related as they
48. See, e.g., FERREN, Goals, Model and Prospects for Clinical-Legal Education in KITCH,
CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 94 (1970); Peden, The Role of
Practical Training in Legal Education: The American and Australian Experience, 24 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 503 (1972).
49. See Redmount, A Conceptual View of the Legal Education Process, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC.
129 (1972) who notes that "[e]motional arousal ... is a determinative influence in further
learning. Learning involvement may be intensified if law regarding commercial transactions is
put in the context of immediate issues involving real people." Id. at 136. See also Dutile, supra,
note 41; Grismer and Shaffer, Experience-Based Teaching Methods in Legal Counseling, 19
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 448 (1970); Kimball, supra, note 47.
50. See BERLYNE, Curiosity and Education, in KRUMBOLTZ, LEARNING AND THE EDUCA-
TIONAL PROCESS (1965); Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444,
487 (1970).
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may be to the reassimilation of the defendant into the community, the lawyer may not be paid
for such service. While a course in law school cannot eliminate this problem, it can at least
identify it and prepare the student for the likelihood of dealing with such a conflict. Once this
problem is identified as significant, it is more likely to be addressed by state and local govern-
ments and the legal profession.
One objection to WLAP is its expense. Some might argue that it is an expensive method for
educating law students and that it can be supported only if the benefits gained justify the cost
incurred. Perhaps, it is suggested, we should be satisfied with cheaper methods and use scarce
resources in other ways.
In the case of WLAP, there are good reasons for incurring the expense aside from its educa-
tional benefits. We put great demands on the criminal justice system in Wisconsin and in most
other states. We ask our police, lawyers, courts and corrections system to do much, without the
resources it takes to do the job properly. Because the criminal justice system is so fragmented,
there is little opportunity for systematic training of newly appointed lawyers. These offices do
not have the luxury of a large law firm which might train its young lawyers in a careful, sys-
tematic way. Many district attorneys and defenders are placed into positions of great responsi-
bility directly out of law school. This places a great responsibility on the law school to
adequately train these lawyers, for law school may be the only opportunity for them to carefully
consider their role and responsibility with adequate guidance. Since it is so important to guide
and encourage the development of this sense of responsibility, the law school and university can
easily justify incurring moderate expense to achieve these important goals.
But as became apparent to John Dewey, 51 mere experience does not insure a high quality
education. Indeed, unguided, raw experience can have devastating results. The student may be
overwhelmed by the new experience, with serious professional and psychological consequences.
Or, if the experience is without guidance, the student learns the wrong things or learns only
part of what should be learned. Exposure of a law student to an experience where teachers are
irresponsible may develop irresponsibility.
What qualities must a program with a substantial field component have to enhance its educa-
tional goals? This issue will be discussed in the specific context of the WLAP.
B. Characteristics of a Legal Assistance Program
Necessary to Achieve Educational Goals
The teacher plays a critical role in achieving the educational goals just described. Exposure to
confined people and their problems, and the rendering of assistance in their resolution is a
crucial component of the educational experience. But if the experience is to be meaningful,
sensitive supervision is necessary. Among other things, this means:
1. Recognition of individual educational needs. There is a great variety of abilities and educa-
tional needs among law students. For instance, the writing ability of students varies greatly.
Some students enter their second year of law school unable to write a simple, tactful letter to a
creditor inquiring about the status of an inmate's debt. Other students are capable of writing
effective, sophisticated briefs. To assign the student with the writing problem a difficult brief is
devastating, and to assign only simple writing assignments to the sophisticated writer provides
no challenge. The poor writer needs a graduated program that helps him develop, while the
good writer needs a challenge at a different level.5 2 The problems of confined persons are as
51. See, e.g., the quite different points of view expressed in J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND
EDUCATION (1916), and J. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938).
52. Redmount, supra note 50, at 165-66, reflects that:
Learning is achieved through first the motivation and then the capacity of the stu-
dent. Motivation is the vehicle that provides drive, inquisitiveness and persistence.
Capacity provides . . . the means, rate and quality of understanding . ...
In effect, a sequence develops in which the student moves from experience to
generalization and, most probably, from fact to law. Generally, one goes from the
simple to the complex, from the concrete to the abstract, and from the observation
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varied as the educational needs of law students. It is not hard to find inmates with debts who
need letters written on their behalf, or confined people who require appellate briefs. Respon-
sibilities can be assigned to fit the present abilities of the students.
Students differ in their emotional development as well as their academic development. The
maturity and self confidence of students vary greatly. Some are able to take ten cases and
systematically work their way through them, assigning priorities intelligently and recognizing
that not all ten cases can be resolved at once. Other students are paralyzed by ten cases, and as
a result are unable to do anything. This can be devastating, for what little confidence that
student had probably disappeared in the face of the apparent failure to deal effectively with the
cases. The recognition of the individual needs of students and the structuring of their experi-
ence to take those needs into account are important ingredients in a good educational experi-
ence.
2. Preparation: the need to bring substantive knowledge to the experience. The dilemma of all
programs in which a student learns, in part, by doing is that one cannot "do" unless one has
some notion about what the problem is and what the options are. It is of little educational value
to send a student in "cold" to help someone. More often than not, the results are devastating
for the client and the student. A substantial basis of knowledge is necessary befbre the process
of learning by doing can begin. The student must have some notion of how to interview a
client, what problems and questions he might anticipate, and what questions he should ask to
elicit the information required if assistance is to be rendered.
The results of the experience are, hopefully, that the young lawyer understands his respon-
sibilities and develops the skill to elicit problems and resolve them. Both the preparation for the
experience and experience itself involve learning how to teach oneself. But not all the problems
one might encounter as a lawyer will be dealt with in law school or in the field experience. It is
important, then, that the young lawyer be prepared to constructively teach himself when he
leaves law school.
An important ingredient in the development of the ability to teach oneself is self-confidence.
For many, the experience in WLAP or a similarly designed course is their first relatively un-
structured experience in which great demands are placed upon them; in which the stakes are as
real as the human needs. While it is counter-productive to be uncritical, it is usually helpful to
reinforce students positively. As they develop confidence in their ability to face new situations,
they are more willing and able to teach themselves.
3. The importance of the available teacher. An exciting characteristic of the Wisconsin Legal
Assistance Program is the enthusiasm of the students for learning. 53 The resolution of problems
and the education of students thus takes on great immediacy. Students need and want assistance
and guidance when they encounter problems. Their desire to learn cannot wait until the
scheduled meeting time. The teacher must then endeavor both to be available to help the
student when the student is ready to learn and to make available to the student the materials
(the most obvious being an adequate library and work space) that the student can use to teach
himself. This is in contrast to the traditional course, when the students come to class at the
assigned hours. Since some students are ready to learn at odd hours, the teacher has to be
ready to teach then, or at least make available to the students adequate materials and learning
situations to enhance the ability of students to learn when they are ready and motivated. This is
demanding of teachers, but their availability is an important quality of an effective legal assis-
tance program.
4. The need to demonstrate the right way and the freedom to make mistakes. People learn
from their mistakes. It is often difficult for a teacher to see a mistake coming, in an interview
to analysis and synthesis. Sequence implies direction and it avoids stagnation and
ineffectual repetition. The sequence is geared to the need and disposition to learn
and must consider the rate at which different learning takes place.
J. BRUNER also notes in T1OWARD A THEORY OF INSTRUCTION 35 (1966) that "[a] curriculum
should involve the mastery of skills that in turn lead to the mastery of still more powerful ones,
the establishment of self-rewarding sequences . . ..
53. See Gelhorn, The Second and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1969);
and Sacks, Remarks on Involvement and Clinical Training, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 452 (1969).
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conducted by a student, for example, and not correct it before it occurs. While this may some-
times be appropriate, it is often more valuable to the student to permit the mistake to occur
and discuss and correct it afterward.
Students must be given the freedom to make mistakes while the teacher insures that the
mistakes do not prejudice the client and do not go uncorrected. Often, an effective way of
correcting a mistake, particularly an interviewing or writing mistake, is to simply demonstrate
an effective way of interviewing or writing. The correcting interviewer thus edits the interview,
just as the editor corrects the letter or brief.
A great danger is to demonstrate the wrong way to do things and point out the mistakes in a
discussion afterward. The inexperienced student can suffer a real setback by being shown the
wrong way to do something, for this is what he remembers. The lesson is that when one is
demonstrating, one should do it right.
5. The importance of student contact with each other. Students can learn a great deal from
each other. 54 Even so simple a thing as a common place where each student has his own work
space and where students can talk to each other about mutual legal problems can be an ex-
tremely important educational tool. Fortunately WLAP has its own building with an office for
each attorney, a desk for each student and a library. This creates a situation in which students
can learn from one another, consult with attorneys as is necessary and have the necessary
materials available.
6. The importance of a formal meeting of students and teacher. It is also important that
students and teacher meet in a formal setting to insure that the students have the opportunity
to share mutual problems and insight to insure that problems are kept in the proper perspec-
tive. There is a tendency in a program of the kind I have described for students to so focus
their attention on individual problems that they fail to fully understand the significance of the
problem in a more general context. For example, a student who has learned about the exercise
of discretion in a parole hearing, as in Illustration 10, may fail to grasp the point that discretion
characterizes many parts of the system. A class discussion may be needed to emphasize this
point. Once the student makes the connection between what the parole board does and what
the police officer does when he decides to arrest or not arrest, he may have real insight into the
exercise of discretion. Structured discussions, based on the experience of students, is necessary
to reach a desirable level of understanding and generalization. It is a useful vehicle for helping
students assess the true significance of their experience.
54. See Shaffer, Collaboration in Studying Law, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 239 (1973) wherein
Thomas Shaffer describes an experiment at Notre Dame in which "cooperative student
strategies" were suggested to incoming law students. The program offered "good evidence that
students who work together in studying and understanding .. . difficult material do better
when they assist and accept assistance from each other." Id.
